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Voluntary Environmental Action 
and Export Destinations: 
The Case of Forest Certification 
Klaus Moeltner and G. Cornelis van Kooten 
There is an increasing tendency for forest product firms worldwide to adopt sound 
environmental management practices by voluntarily agreeing to have their forest 
practices certified by third parties. Using a simple model of profit maximization, we 
illustrate that the puzzling emergence of  this non-state, self-imposed governance 
structure is compatible with firms' profit motives. An empirical model using firm 
data from three countries shows firm location and export destinations play a key role 
in firms' decisions to seek certification,  while the nature of forestland ownership has 
no significant impact on certification decisions. 
Key words: discrete choice models, export markets, forest certification, profit 
maximization 
Introduction 
One of  the most challenging tasks facing policy makers today is that of  developing 
appropriate policy instruments  for addressing environmental spillovers. Different 
instrument choices available  to governments  for protecting the environment  and encour- 
aging sustainable development include command-and-control  regulations which have 
historically been preferred and continue to be the instrument of  choice (Stavins), and 
market-based incentives such as taxes and cap-and-trade schemes (Stavins; Lippke and 
Oliver). 
Whether regulations or incentives are employed, state involvement is required, if only 
to determine a cap level, and enforce and monitor the subsequent trading mechanism. 
Reliance on private transactions to resolve environmental spillovers, as argued by 
Coase, is generally eschewed because empirical evidence of  its success is lacking. The 
conclusion is often that transaction costs of  reaching agreements are onerous, so some 
form of  state involvement is required. Even where firms have voluntarily agreed to 
"~orrect'~  an environmental externality, the explicit threat of  state intervention is gener- 
ally a prerequisite for such an agreement (Segerson and Miceli). 
Remarkably, there is now increasing evidence of  the emergence of  non-state, self- 
imposed governance structures for addressing environmental spillovers. These gover- 
nance structures are now appearing  in a number of  sectors, such as agriculture (Loureiro, 
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McCluskey, and Mittelhammer), fisheries (Johnston et  al.), and forestry (Cashore, Auld, 
and Newsom). Forest certification is an  example of governance seeking to address 
environmental spillovers related to the "proper" and "sustainable" exploitation of 
forests-i.e.,  that forest operations do not endanger wildlife and watersheds, and that 
logging companies and landowners practice sustainable forest management (SFM). 
Thus, under forest certification, private firms address spillovers voluntarily. 
In  the  past, researchers investigating forest certification have described the  evolution 
of institutions for certifying forest practices and wood products, or have focused on politi- 
cal and social explanations for voluntary behavior (Gale and Burda). There is the view 
that  firms will voluntarily enter environmental agreements without the threat of state 
intervention because such agreements give them the social license to cause some envi- 
ronmental harm, as  not all spillovers can be mitigated in any event. This is one form of 
the ethical argument of "corporate responsibility"-managers  of firms feel they have to 
behave in a socially acceptable manner. Managers may have a social and environmental 
conscience that needs to be assuaged. Both the behavior of  managers and community 
pressure are cited as impetus for forest certification (Hayward and Vertinsky). 
There have been few studies on potential economic incentives for forest certification. 
Some economic studies have sought to determine whether and under what conditions 
firms would benefit from forest certification (Swallow and Sedjo), while others have 
focused on whether forest certification enhanced social welfare. For example, Vertinsky 
and Zhou demonstrate, theoretically,  that  voluntary ~ert~cation  coupled with a minimum 
quality standard is preferable to state-enforced SFM standards from a welfare stand- 
point. Haener and Luckert argue, however, that this comparison of two different forms 
of regulation is inadequate: if compared with market instruments, certification is not 
the economically most efficient means for addressing environmental spillovers related 
to forestry activities. 
In  this study, we claim that  timber firms, like any other private market player, follow 
the paradigm of profit maximization when deciding to certify their forest practices. We 
develop a theoretical model of profit maximization consistent with the notion that 
certification may provide cost advantages in export markets. A simplified version of the 
model is implemented using firm-specific survey data from Canada, the United States, 
and Germany. To our knowledge, there exist no studies investigating voluntary forest 
cert5cation  from this profit-driven,  market-based perspective,  or which offer an  empirical 
analysis of this phenomenon. 
Forest Certification Programs 
Forest certification programs can be divided into several categories, depending on their 
scope, what is certified, and their philosophy. At the global level, there are two forest 
certification programs, those of the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Inter- 
national Standards Organization (ISO).  The FSC was formed in 1993  by environmentall 
nongovernmental organizations, foresters, and some timber companies. It develops 
standards for sustainable forest management and then certifies companies (or land- 
owners) practicing sustainable forestry according to its  rules. In  this sense, FSC certifi- 
cation is a private regulatory scheme for sustainable forest management. 
IS0  certification of forest practices began when the Business Council for Sustainable 
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1991  with the development of  standards of  environmental management. The result, in 
1996,  was IS0  14001  ("Environmental  Management Systems-specification  with guid- 
ance for use"), which established the requirements of  an environmental management 
system for any industry, including  forestry.  IS0  14001  provides a generic, system-based 
forest certification program, but it is focused on processes (e.g., harvest methods) and 
not sustainable  forest management (e.g., there is no requirement for post-harvest 
regeneration). 
In direct response to FSC certification of  sustainable forest management, domestic 
and regional competitor programs were started by the forest industry in North America 
and landowner organizations  in Europe. In Canada, the Canadian Pulp and Paper Asso- 
ciation (now the Canadian Forest Products Association) asked the Canadian Standards 
Association (CSA)  to develop aforest certification program based on a systems approach 
to sustainable forest management. To become certified, forest companies owning land 
or logging timber from public lands under long-term management agreements would be 
required to establish environmental management systems for forestry which include 
auditing requirements. CSA certification has built-in flexibility to encourage ongoing 
improvements in forest management. Although CSA certification was initiated by 
industry, its requirements are quite stringent; costs of  obtaining and complying with 
CSA certification are  now comparable with those of  FSC certification,  but CSA lacks the 
same global recognition as FSC. 
In  the  United States,  the  American Forest and Paper Association's Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative (SFI)  requires firms to file reports with SF1 regarding their sustain- 
able forest management plans. Like CSA certification, no attempt is made to follow 
wood fiber through its various stages to the final consumer (chain-of-custody  certifi- 
cation), although labeling of  products is emerging (Meridian Institute). Because many 
Canadian forest firms are U.S. owned and the United States is Canada's main export 
market, about half of  certified forestlands in Canada are SF1 certified. 
In Europe, it  was landowners  who developed their own certification program, because 
they felt their needs and opinions were ignored by the FSC. The various national forest 
landowner associations  began the Pan-European Forest Certification (PEFC)  program 
in 1999.  PEFC endorses national programs which then rely on third-party certification. 
With the exception of those under the auspices of FSC, sustainable forest management 
certification programs lack chain-of-custody provisions. The problem with chain of 
custody is that some of the wood from a forest goes into the production of pulpwood, thus 
getting mixed with fiber from various sources, making it nearly impossible to trace fiber 
from the forest to its fmal destination. Consequently, certification at  this stage consists 
primarily of  large retailers, such as Home Depot, guaranteeing that the wood products 
they sell come from certified forestlands. 
FSC certification is based on the concept of market-driven, market-based governance 
that sees a private-sector certifier enforcing stringent global and domestic sustainable 
forest management standards. Procedures are developed with a view to eliminating 
business dominance and encouraging strict standards with limited discretion on the part 
of  certified companies or landowners to vary actual implementation. 
The competing regional certification programs are based on the notion that business 
should dominate rule making, while government and environmentaVnongovernment 
organizations should act in an advisory, consultative capacity. Underlying these pro- 
grams is the view that society's perception of extant forest practices differs from reality. Moeltner and van Kooten  Forest Certification and Exports  305 
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Figure 1. Distribution of global certified forests: Forest Steward- 
ship Council (FSC) and total (total = 122 mil. hectares, June 2002) 
Although addressing environmental externalities plays a role, certification is seen for 
the most part as  a communication tool. With this conception,  procedural approaches are 
ends in themselves, and individual firms retain greater flexibility over implementation 
of program goals and objectives. Because it was industry initiated, IS0 14001  reflects 
a similar perspective, except its forest management rules focus on processes, so that 
forests themselves are not certified. Thus, IS0 14001  is not directly comparable to the 
other programs (van Kooten, Nelson, and Vertinsky). 
As of June 2002, some 122 million hectares of forests had been certified globally 
under the above programs (figure I), nearly double the 66 million hectares certified in 
March 2001. This constitutes only 3%  of all forests, and excludes IS0  14001  certification 
as it does not certify forestlands. FSC certification accounts for 28.4 million hectares, 
while regional competitor schemes account for 93.5  million hectares. Further,  as  evident 
from figure 1,  industrial countries account for nearly all of the certified forest area, with 
FSC certification being more important in Africa,  Asia, Latin America, and Eastern and 
Central Europe-regions  where domestic competitor programs have not taken hold. 
Economic Incentives for Forest Certification 
Economic incentives explaining why firms embark on unilateral environmental initia- 
tives, such as forest certification, have been proposed in the past. One reason for 
unilateral action is  its  potential to lead to areduction in operating costs while enhancing 
resource productivity. For example, firms frequently discover that, by  implementing 
energy-saving  programs or redesigning  production processes, production costs are 
lowered (Schmidheiny and Timberlake). 
A second reason for unilateral action is that certified products may command a price 
premium over uncertified goods, at  least in some target markets (e.g., Johnston et al.). 
Swallow and Sedjo provide theoretical arguments for why a price premium might exist, 
and how both certified and noncertified firms can benefit. However, if certification does 
not increase marginal costs, there may be no price premium. In developed countries, 306  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
forest certification might not increase marginal costs because, as Swallow and Sedjo 
point out, many forests are already sustainably managed to satisfy extant government 
environmental regulations. Further, the international trade regime in wood products, 
which is characterized by distorting import duties, export subsidies, and exports of 
illegally harvested timber, might diminish or eliminate any price premium for certified 
products. These explanations could account for the lack of empirical evidence of a price 
premium for certified wood products (Baldwin; Kim and Carlton). 
In the absence of price premiums, firms have an incentive to invest in certification 
if it reduces operating costs or costs of meeting government regulations (Khanna and 
Anton). Alternatively, as argued here, a firm will invest in certification if it generates 
goodwill for its products, thereby reducing lobbying and marketing outlays and dimin- 
ishing the threat of product boycotts or environmental lawsuits. Of course, the latter 
benefits depend on the environmental awareness and preferences of consumers in 
different target markets. 
As Johnston et al. have shown, this heterogeneity in preferences for sustainable 
resource management can be very pronounced across markets for certain products. For 
wood products, sustainable forest management appears to be of greater concern to 
European buyers than those in North America or Asia (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom).' 
Accordingly, one could hypothesize that the  more a firm relies on European markets, the 
greater is  the chance it  will certify its forest operations. This study provides an  empirical 
test of this premise. 
The real or perceived benefits of forest certification need to be balanced against costs. 
Costs can be divided into the direct costs of obtaining and maintaining certification- 
filling out application forms, bargaining with the certifier, audit preparation, paying 
monitoring costs, etc.-and  the indirect costs of  changing forest practices to meet 
certification requirements. Forest companies operating in industrial countries already 
comply with a variety of  environmental standards, but one expects firms harvesting 
timber on public lands to be held to a higher standard than firms operating on private 
lands, because the public manager takes into account the externality costs of logging. 
Accordingly, the incremental costs of adjusting forest operations to be compatible with 
certification requirements should be smaller for forest firms which rely predominantly 
on public timber. Apart from land ownership, one might expect certification to be more 
prevalent in Canada than in other countries, because it has the world's most stringent 
environmental regulations for forestry (Pearse). The empirical model proposed in this 
study investigates these premises. 
Based on these arguments and the literature on this topic (reviewed by Khanna), the 
following section develops a theoretical profit-maximization model around three major 
factors: firm location, the cost of resource inputs, and the role of output markets. 
The Theoretical Model 
Suppose a given forest company i sells a homogeneous wood product to a domestic 
market (D),  Asia (A), Europe (E),  and (nondomestic)  North America (NA),  earning 
profit: 
In personal discussions with one of the authors, forest company executives have made similar observations about the 
difference between North America and  Asia vis-a-vis Europe. Moeltner and van Kooten  Forest Certzjkation and Exports  307 
where R is  total revenues, C is  total costs, and there are  n firms. Revenue is determined 
by firm i's output to the domestic market (q,)  and the other export destinations, as  well 
as  by the price of its product in each of the  four markets (P,,  P,,  KEA,  E,  NA). Total costs 
are a function of  the firm's nontimber inputs Ni and their associated price vector wi; 
output to each destination with cost vector y,, for marketing, transportation, and insur- 
ance; total timber inputs procured from private and public sources (t,  and tip,  respec- 
tively) with price vector y,;  and certification status ci (= 1  if certified, 0 otherwise). 
Certification imposes a direct, fxed cost on the firm, labeled Fi,  but certified firms do 
not have to incur lobbying costs in foreign markets. Specifically, the marginal costs 
associated with sales abroad for marketing, transportation, and insurance are  assumed 
to increase by a fixed amount for noncertified firms, because such firms need to over- 
come, by increased advertising  and lobbying  efforts, say, the  reluctance of foreign buyers 
to purchase noncertified merchandise. 
For example, net revenues from certification and noncertification can be modeled as: 
where superscripts 1  and 0 indicate whether the firm is certified or not, and y,  is a 
constant marginal cost term including the unit cost of timber production and shipping 
to destination market K, regardless of certification status. The "goodwill" premium on 
marginal costs, P,,  is assumed negligible in  the  domestic market due  to well-established 
marketing relations, and a hesitation to impose market barriers on a domestic firm 
(Cashore, Auld, and Newsom). 
The remaining terms in  the  expression for total cost relate to timber inputs,  which are 
assumed to be procured domestically. We assume a priori that  the  self-imposed environ- 
mental stipulations under certification translate into increased operating costs for a 
given firm when accessing timber from any land compared to pre-certification status. 
As discussed in  the  previous section, these incremental costs may be smaller for existing 
operations on public land (especially for firms with long-standing tenure on such lands) 
than  for logging on private land. The cost specification incorporates this notion. Assuming 
additive separability between nontimber, timber, and export costs, total costs to non- 
certified and certified firms, respectively, are thus given by: 
where y,  and yip are the constant per unit prices for private and public inputs, and Pr 
and Pp denote cost premiums on inputs from private and public sources, respectively, for 
certified firms. A firm will choose certification if it leads to an increase in profits, i.e., 
if  ~f  -  X:  > 0. 308  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Given the documented lack of observed price differentials between certified and 
uncertified timber products, total revenue is modeled independently of  certification. 
Consequently, the difference in profits reduces to differences in costs, 
This expression has intuitive appeal: the first three terms represent total benefits from 
certification, while the last three terms measure total costs. Thus, a given firm will seek 
certification if net benefits are positive. 
Given information on quantities of inputs and outputs, certification costs, and certifi- 
cation status at  the firm level, equation (4) could form the basis for a standard dichoto- 
mous choice model, such as a logit or probit, for estimating how each observed element 
on the right-hand side of (4) affects the probability of a given firm seeking certification. 
Such a model would also yield empirical estimates for the marginal cost differentials 
PK (KEA,  E,  NA), P,,  and P,. 
The data available for this analysis exhibit several shortcomings compared to this 
"ideal" scenario. In lieu of  actual input and output quantities, the data contain only 
information on firm location, the value share of sales to various destinations, and on the 
share of inputs  from public and private lands for a given h.  This preempts specification 
of an empirical model that is fully consistent with the theoretical framework outlined 
above. Instead, we implement the following estimable probability model: 
Thus, the probability of observing that firm i is certified (pi)  is modeled as a standard 
logistic cumulative distribution function (Evans,  Hastings, and Peacock). The elements 
of  x, are a constant; a dummy variable if firm i is located in Canada (DCMpi  = 1);  an 
analogous intercept shifter for the United States (DUsti),  value-of-sales shares to Asia, 
Europe, and (nondomestic) North America (xAi,  xEPi,  xNAPi);  and the share of fiber inputs 
from public sources (x,,~).  Vector p includes associated coefficients. It should be noted 
that the elements of p do not directly correspond to the marginal cost terms in (4). They 
simply constitute empirical estimates which, as  components of expressions for marginal 
effects, show how each regressor in (5) affects certification probabilities. 
While this formulation is incomplete compared to a specification flowing from (4), it 
still allows testing of some interesting hypotheses associated with certification choices. 
Specifically, based on the discussion in the previous two sections,~,  is expected a priori 
to be positively related to firm location in Canada, export value shares to Europe, and 
reliance on public lands for timber inputs. As shown below, this empirical specification 
provides a close fit with the underlying sample data. 
Data Analysis 
The data come from three separate surveys: one conducted in Canada in 1999 (Wilson, 
Takahashi, and  Vertinsky), one in the United States  in 1999 (Auld, Cashore, and 
Newsom), and one in Germany in 2000 (Affolderbach).  The sample made available is Moeltner and van Kooten  Forest Certz3cation and Exports  309 
Table 1. Percentages and Types of Certification by Firm Location 
Firm Location  Total 
Item  USA  Canada  Germany  Sample 
Number of Firms  283  143  134  560 
Firms Not Certified:  242  102  125  469 
r With some exports  120  84  64  268 
With some exports to Asia  50  36  16  102 
With some exports to Europe  51  30  59  140 
With some exports to North America  116  84  61  261 
Firms Certified:  41  41  9  91 
r With some exports  29  38  9  76 
With some exports to Asia  19  28  4  5  1 
r With some exports to Europe  12  29  7  48 
With some exports to North America  27  36  8  7  1 
Type of Certification:  <---------------(yo)--------------- > 
r Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)  9.5  6.3  3.0  7.1 
Internat. Standards  Organization (IS0 14001)  2.1  19.2  0.7  5.4 
r Canadian Standards Association (CSA) "  none  18.4  none  4.1 
r Sustainable Forest Initiative (SFI) (USA)  7.1  none  5.2  4.8 
Share of Timber from Private Sources:  <---------------("/o)---------------  > 
r All Firms:  Mean  67.2  10.2  21.8  41.8 
Median  85.0  0.0  10.0  30.0 
r Certified:  Mean  74.3  11.0  23.9  41.9 
Median  90.0  0.0  30.0  30.0 
Not Certified:  Mean  65.9  9.9  21.6  40.8 
Median  85.0  0.0  10.0  29.0 
" CSA includes an  earlier program known as FOREST CARE. 
comprised of 143 Canadian, 283 United States, and 134 German firms, yielding a total 
of  560  observation^.^ 
For this study, a firm is considered certified if it had actually completed the certifi- 
cation process or was prepared for an audit by the certifier, having thus incurred all the 
direct costs of  certifying. Based on this definition, approximately 16% of firms in the 
sample are certified (table 1).  Naturally, the causality flow implied by the theoretical 
and empirical models described in the previous section rests on the  underlying assump- 
tion that export patterns were in place before attainment of certification status. Of the 
firms treated as "certified" in our sample, half were in the final stage of the certification 
process, while the majority of the remainder actually became certified in the year prior 
to being surveyed. Therefore, the assumption of  predetermined export shares appears 
reasonable for our sample. 
For Canada, 475 forest-industry executives were surveyed, with 143  responding (30% response rate); 2,131 firms in  the 
United States  were surveyed, with 286 completed surveys returned (13.4%), but only 283 usable; and 215 out of 2,764 firms 
responded (7.8%) to the German survey, but, for various reasons, only 134 surveys were made available. Questions used in 
the U.S. and German surveys were based on those in the Canadian survey, although in those countries the authors surveyed 
mainly smaller firms for which lower response rates are the norm. Response rates among executives are notoriously low and 
it would be erroneous to compare these with response rates from household surveys (e.g., see Friedman and Singh). For 
details on survey design, response rates, and so forth, the reader is referred to the original studies, although copies of the 
original surveys (in English) are available on request from the current authors. 310  August2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
On the basis of the surveys, Canada has by far the largest proportion of certified 
firms, followed by the United States and Germany (table 1).  Some firms are certified 
under more than one program, but firms with multiple certification are a relatively 
small proportion of certified firms in each country.3 In this sample, FSC is the leading 
certification scheme in the United States, while IS0  and SF1 dominate in Canada and 
Germany, respectively. For the entire sample of 560 firms, FSC certified firms comprise 
7.1% of total forest firms, followed by IS0  (5.4%),  SF1 (4.8%), and CSA (4.1%). 
Certified firms  rely more on private timber sources than do their noncertified counter- 
parts (table 1).  The average noncertified U.S. firm draws about two-thirds of its timber 
supplies from private sources, while certified companies obtain nearly three-quarters 
of raw fiber from private sources. The high median values relative to the means (85% 
versus 90%,  respectively) indicate that, for most U.S. firms, private sources clearly dom- 
inate public firms, although a few companies may rely quite heavily on public timber. 
On average, a Canadian company obtains only about 10%  of its wood fiber from 
private sources, with no significant difference between the certified and noncertified 
firms. A zero median indicates this distribution is skewed to the right, and private 
providers play a significantly greater role for a few individual firms. This finding is not 
surprising, because Canada has the highest public ownership of  timberlands in the 
world, with nearly 95% of land publicly owned (Wilson et  al.). Finally, the average Ger- 
man firm purchases roughly 22% of its timber from private sources, but, as  in Canada, 
certified and noncertified firms do not differ much by ownership. 
The data also include information on export patterns for individual firms (table 1). 
Canada has  by far  the largest share of exporting firms, followed more distantly by 
Germany and the United States. For all three locations, the share of firms with at  least 
some exports is significantly larger for those that are certified compared to those that 
are not. In  Germany, for example, there is virtually no certified firm which does not sell 
some of its  merchandise abroad. For the entire sample, the  percentage of exporting  firms 
in the "certified" category is about 25% higher than for the noncertified segment. 
From table 1,  it  is also apparent that  in all three countries more firms export to North 
America than to any other region. Specifically, close to 84% of all Canadian firms ship 
some output to the United States, compared to 40%-45% of Canadian firms that export 
to other regions. Conversely, Canada is  the United States' primary destination for 
exports, with half of U.S. firms shipping to Canada versus less than a quarter to Asia 
or Europe. For Germany, the number of firms exporting to other European countries is 
comparable to the number of firms exporting to the United States, and clearly exceeds 
the number shipping to Asia. As for overall exports, the share of exporting companies 
among certified firms is larger than for the noncertified category for all origin- 
destination pairs. This also holds for the pooled sample. 
The share of sales value accruing to firms from shipments to foreign destinations is 
also important (table 2). The mean percentage of  sales exported over all firms in the 
sample exceeds 23%. This share is highest for Canada and lowest for the United States. 
On average, and for all three countries, a certified firm relies more heavily on exports, 
as  measured by value, than a noncertified one (table  2). For the  pooled sample, the  share 
Because we are interested only in examining whether a firm is certified or not, we do not attempt to determine what 
factors cause a firm to choose a particular certification  program or why a firm chooses two or more programs. Auld, Cashore, 
and Newsom examine this issue in more detail using the same data, while Cashore et al. use a multinomial logit model to 
examine non-economic factors which cause firms to certify forest management practices. Moeltner and van Kooten  Forest CertiJication  and Exports  3 1  1 
Table 2. Share of Sales to Various Destinations (%) 
Percent of Sales Exported to: 
North  All 
Firm Location  Asia  Europe  America  Destinations 
United States: 
Not Certified  1.9  1.3  4.8  8.0 
Certified  1.9  1.3  9.9  13.0 
Total  1.9  1.3  5.6  8.7 
Canada: 
Not Certified  4.2  3.3  44.6  52.0 
Certified  12.8  11.4  45.5  69.7 




Total  1.5  7.5  9.4  18.4 
All Firms: 
Not Certified  2.3  3.3  14.5  20.1 
Certified  6.7  6.7  26.8  40.1 
Total  3.0  3.9  16.5  23.4 
of  total proceeds stemming from exports is almost twice as high for a certified firm as 
for one not certified (40.1%  versus 20.1%).  As evident from the "total" rows in the first 
three columns, a typical firm collects a larger share of  revenues from exports to North 
America  than from  sales in any other export region. This difference is especially 
pronounced for Canada, where sales to the United States constitute close to 45%  of  the 
revenue of  an average forest products company, compared to 6%-7% of  sales from 
exports to Asia and Europe. 
Generally, the sample statistics captured in tables 1  and 2 strongly suggest a firm's 
decision to pursue forest certification is related to its reliance on exports. The econo- 
metric model described above is employed to investigate this relationship in a multi- 
variate context. 
Estimation Results 
Estimation results for the logit model (5) are provided in table 3. The model fits the 
underlying data well, with all but one parameter estimate significant at  the 10%  level 
or higher. As indicated by the positive and significant coefficient for the United States 
(0.82),  the probability of  certification is higher for a firm located in the United States 
than for a German firm, our implicit baseline category. This probability further 
increases for a firm located in Canada (PC,,  = 1.43). These findings are consistent with 
the sample statistics shown in table 1. A possible explanation for Canadian firms being 
the most likely to certify is that Canadian firms are already subject to stringent environ- 
mental regulations, and thus do not need to make substantial adjustments to their forest 
operations to become certified. 3 12  August 2003  Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 




Coefficient  t-Statistic 
Intercept  -2.57***  -5.24 
= 1  if firm located in United States  0.82*  1.81 
= 1  if firm located in Canada  1.43***  3.13 
Share of  sales value from exports to Asia  2.04**  2.12 
Share of  sales value from exports to Europe  2.34**  2.32 
Share of  sales value from exports to nondomestic N. America  1.00*  1.80 
Proportion of fiber from public lands  -0.60  -  1.46 
Log likelihood = 227.66 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*) denote significance at the lo%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Shares of sales value directed to export markets have a strong and significant effect 
on a firm's decision to seek forest certification, as  indicated by the positive sign and sig- 
nificant t-values for share of sales value from exports to Asia, share of sales value from 
exports to Europe, and share  of sales  value from exports to North America. As expected, 
value-of-export shares  to  Europe boost certification probabilities by the  greatest  amount, 
closely followed by shares to Asia. In comparison, the impact of value-of-export shares 
to nondomestic North America on the probability of becoming certified is lower, and less 
significant. This result is consistent with the observation of Cashore et  al. that  consum- 
ers in Europe are the most sensitive to sustainable forestry issues. Thus, to maintain 
market shares in that region, foreign firms are under more pressure to certify their 
products compared to other export destinations. 
On the other hand, the relatively smaller impact of exports to North America on 
certification decisions might be related to the fact that more than 90% of wood products 
consumed in North America are produced within the region, which has led to many 
informal marketing channels and agreements. This existing framework may mitigate 
the need for certification. 
Clearly, firm location and value-of-export shares  play a more important role in firms' 
decisions to seek certification than the origin of input fibers. This is highlighted by the 
lack of significance for the share of inputs from public lands.4 
Due to the predominance of the noncertification choice in the sample, the use of the 
"hit rate" or "highest probability principle" to assess  model fit is  problematic (Ben-Akiva 
and Lerman).  Instead,  predicted probabilities of certification are compared with sample 
shares for individual origins and for the pooled data. As shown in the  first two rows of 
table 4, the logit model predicts certification shares  with high accuracy, not only for the 
entire sample, but also for each origin category. In fact, predicted probabilities deviate 
from sample shares by no more than 0.5% for all three origins. This finding lends hrther 
credibility to the explanatory power of the empirical specification. 
A model with interaction terms for "proportion of  fibers from public landn  with ''United States" and "Canadan was also 
estimated. This specification  change did not lead to measurable improvements in  model fit. A corresponding  likelihood-ratio 
test  (x2  =  0.06,2  degrees of freedom)  does not allow rejection of the null hypothesis that  these additional parameters are equal 
to zero at any conventional level of  significance. Moeltner and van Kooten  Forest Certification and Exports  3 13 
Table 4. Predicted Probabilities and Marginal Effects (%) 
Firm Location 
Description  USA  Canada  Germany  All 
Certification Shares: 
Sample  14.49  28.67  6.20  16.25 
Predicted  14.92  28.64  6.40  16.25 
Note: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*) denote significance at  the lo%, 5%, and 1%  levels, respectively. 
"Marginal effect = effect of share of sales value to a given destination on probability of certification. 
The marginal effects of export shares on certification probabilities are  reported in the 
bottom portion of table 4.  These marginal effects were obtained by taking the average 
of firm-specific effects over all observations. Because value-of-export shares enter the 
model as  fractions of one, the values presented in the table can be directly interpreted 
as the percentage change in the probability of  certification from a 1%  change in sales 
value shares associated with a specific destination. 
Table 4  also shows approximate standard errors for these effects and associated levels 
of  significance. Standard errors were derived following the procedures described in 
Krinsky and Robb using 10,000  draws of  coefficient vectors. Except for the impact of 
value-of-export shares to North America for German firms, all marginal effects are 
statistically significant at  the 10% level or higher. 
By origin, these marginal effects are stronger for Canada than for the United States 
or Germany, and for all destinations. For example, a 1% increase in exports to Europe 
raises certification odds by 0.45% for a Canadian firm, compared to 0.28% for U.S. firms 
and 0.14% for German firms. By destination, the mean marginal effect of export shares 
to Europe is stronger than mean effects of  exports to other destinations for all firm 
origins. This difference is especially pronounced for Europe versus North America, but 
subtler for Europe versus Asia. While the comparable magnitude of marginal effects for 
the latter two destinations could be an artifact of the relatively pronounced correlation 
between export shares to the two regions for many firms, it  may also suggest that  Asian 
customers' preferences for sustainable forest management goods are similar to those of 
Europeans. 
Overall, a comparison of the results in table 4  to the sample statistics in tables 1  and 
2  indicates that, while firms from all three origins rely most heavily on North America 
as  an  export destination, certification decisions are more sensitive to export shares  allo- 
cated to Europe and Asia. 
Asia  Eur.  N.Am. 
0.26  0.29  0.13 
0.12  0.13  0.07 
**  **  * 
MarginalEffects:"  Asia  Eur.  N.Am. 
Mean  0.25  0.28  0.12 
Std.Error  0.12  0.13  0.07 
**  **  * 
Discussion 
Forest certification provides an example of a non-state, self-imposed governance struc- 
ture for natural  resources. While some have argued such governance structures emerge 
for reasons associated with social licenswommunity  pressure, desire to be good corpor- 
ate  citizens-the  theoretical model and empirical results presented in this study suggest 
firms' economic motives also play a role in certification decisions. This is the  case despite 
Asia  Eur.  N.Am. 
0.39  0.45  0.19 
0.18  0.19  0.11 
**  **  * 
Asia  Eur.  N.Am. 
0.13  0.14  0.06 
0.07  0.08  0.04 
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the fact that certified forest products do not command a price premium (Kim and 
Carlton). In addition, it is shown here that sources for raw material inputs, such as 
whether timber comes from public or private forestlands, are not important. Rather, 
market factors and firm location are what matter. Indeed, concern about selling wood 
products in export markets seems to be an  important factor explaining why firms certify 
forest practices. 
Future research needs to separate the importance of  the role played by "corporate 
responsibility" in  firms' decisions  to adopt voluntary environmental improvements vis-a- 
vis the  profit motive. Richer data in conjunction with a more elaborate theoretical model 
will be required to separate goodwill from more tangible market incentives. 
The results of this study also raise interesting questions regarding international 
spillovers from forest practices. For example, if consumers in Europe demand (certified) 
wood products from sustainably managed forests, citizens of exporting countries with 
lax environmental regulations in forestry may benefit. If forest companies in an  export- 
ing  country follow market incentives, become certified, and engage in sustainable forest 
management, that country's citizens benefit from higher forest quality. To the extent 
that some of the costs of certification, and thus forest improvements, are eventually 
borne by European consumers, European preferences for green forest products may 
generate positive environmental externalities in forest exporting countries. Further 
investigation and quantification of economic spillovers and their impacts constitute 
fertile ground for future research. 
[Received August 2002;final revision received March 2003.1 
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